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HERNANDEZ-MONTIEL V. I.N.S.
225 F.3D 1084 (9TH CIR. 2000)
BACKGROUND
February 22, 1995, Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel filed a petition
for asylum in the United States and a withholding of deportation to
his native Mexico.1  He sought asylum on grounds that he would face
future persecution in Mexico on account of his homosexual status as
a male with a female sexual identity.2
Hernandez-Montiel testified at his asylum hearing that at age eight
he knew that he was attracted to people of the same sex, and at age
twelve he began “dressing and behaving as a woman.”3  His family and
school considered his sexual identity to be a “problem.”4
In addition to being ostracized from his family and school,
Hernandez-Montiel faced harassment by police officers.5  Police
officers were known to detain Hernandez-Montiel and subject him to
strip-searches because he was socializing with other gay men.6  Also,
on two occasions, when he was fourteen, Hernandez-Montiel was
sexually assaulted by police officers and threatened with
imprisonment and death if he did not comply.7
Additionally, in February 1993, Hernandez-Montiel was attacked by
                                                          
1. Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 1089.
3. Id. at 1087.
4. Id. at 1088.
5. Id.
6. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1088.  Additionally, on two occasions in 1992, police
stopped Hernandez-Montiel and a friend and arrested them on the grounds “that it was illegal
for homosexuals to walk down the street and for men to dress like women.” Id.  Hernandez-
Montiel was never charged with a crime.  Id.
7. Id.  In November 1992, Hernandez-Montiel was grabbed from the street, thrown into a
police car, and driven to a remote area where he was forced to perform oral sex on a police
officer.  Id.  He was informed that if he told anyone about the incident, he would be beaten and
imprisoned.  Id.  On the second occasion, approximately two weeks later, two officers grabbed
Hernandez-Montiel and a gay friend from a bus stop and drove them to a remote area where
they were anally raped.  Id.
1
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a group of young men and hospitalized for a week.8  During the
attack, the young men called him names relating to his sexual
identity.9
Hernandez-Montiel first fled to the United States in October 1993
at age fifteen.10  Within a few days, he was arrested and returned to
Mexico to live with his sister.11  Hernandez-Montiel last entered the
United States without inspection on October 12, 1994, and on
February 22, 1995, he filed an application for asylum and withholding
of deportation.12
The immigration judge denied Hernandez-Montiel’s petition on
statutory grounds,13 holding that that Hernandez-Montiel “failed to
demonstrate persecution ‘on account of [membership in] a
particular social group.’”14  The judge identified Hernandez-Montiel’s
social group as “homosexual males who wish to dress as a woman.”15
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied Hernandez-
Montiel’s appeal on statutory grounds and classified his social group
as “homosexual males who dress as females.”16  It held that
Hernandez-Montiel did not establish persecution on the basis of his
homosexuality, but on the basis of the way he dressed.17  The BIA




11. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1088.  His sister enrolled him in a counseling program,
which was designed to “cure” Hernandez-Montiel of his sexual orientation.  Id.  After
approximately two months, his sister withdrew him from the program because he had not
altered his sexual orientation.  Id.  She brought him home and later threw him out of the house
because he was not cured of his homosexuality.  Id. at 1088-89.
12. Id. at 1089.
13. Id. at 1089-91.  See also Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1101 (a)(42)(A) (1994) [hereinafter INA].  The INA defines refugee as a person who
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country [of
which he/she has nationality or has last habitually resided] because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on the account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1089.
15. Id. (quotations omitted).  The judge did not find Hernandez-Montiel’s sexual identity
to be an immutable characteristic and explained that:
If he wears typical female clothing sometimes, and typical male clothing other times,
he cannot characterize his assumed female persona as immutable or fundamental to
his identity.  The record reflects that respondent’s decision to dress as a [woman] is
volitional, not immutable, and the fact that he sometimes dresses like a typical man
reflects that respondent himself may not view his dress as being so fundamental to his
identity that he should not have changed it.
Id.
16. Id. (quotations omitted).
17. Id. at 1089-90.
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concluded that choosing a manner in which to dress is not an
immutable characteristic.18
HOLDING
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard
Hernandez-Montiel’s appeal and held that “gay men with female
sexual identities in Mexico constitute a ‘particular social group’ and
that [Hernandez-Montiel] is a member of that group.”19  The Ninth
Circuit also concluded that Hernandez-Montiel’s sexual identity is an
immutable characteristic and “inherent in his identity.”20
Furthermore, the court held that on account of his membership in
the particular social group, Hernandez-Montiel would likely face
future persecution upon his return to Mexico.21  The case was
remanded to the BIA with instructions to grant Hernandez-Montiel’s
withholding of deportation and to present the case before the
Attorney General with instructions to exercise discretion and grant
Hernandez-Montiel asylum.22
NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit first established that the issue was to determine
“whether gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico constitute a
protected ‘particular social group’ under the asylum statute.”23  The
legal question was whether Hernandez-Montiel “was persecuted on
account of his membership in a ‘particular social group.’”24
“Particular social group” is not defined in the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (“INA”), and the case law does not have a
consistent definition.25  The Ninth Circuit relied on the case law in
Matter of Acosta26 and Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S.27
                                                          
18. Id. at 1090 (remarking that both the immigration judge and the BIA chose not to
exercise discretion in granting Hernandez-Montiel’s petition for asylum).
19. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 1099 (holding that where the Immigration and Nautralization Service
(“I.N.S.”) fails to rebut the presumption that because an asylum seeker has faced past
persecution on the basis of membership in a particular social group he/she will face future
persecution, it must be presumed that he has well-founded fear of future persecution).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1087.  See also INA § 101(a)(42)(A).
24. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d. at 1091.
25. Id.
26. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (holding that membership in a particular group
requires members to share an immutable, fundamental characteristic and that taxi-drivers are
not members of a particular social group because occupations are not immutable).
27. 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the definition of membership in
3
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In Matter of Acosta, the BIA held that membership in a particular
social group requires the members of that group to share an
immutable characteristic.28  Conversely, the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez-
Trujillo v. I.N.S. concluded that membership in a particular group is
broad and flexible, and should be determined on the basis of a
person’s voluntary association with others.29
In Hernandez-Montiel, the Ninth Circuit chose to adopt Acosta’s
immutable characteristic standard and expand its decision in Sanchez-
Trujillo.30  It held that a particular social group is defined by voluntary
association or by an immutable characteristic “so fundamental to the
identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot
or should not be required to change it.”31
Based on district court and BIA decisions, as well as academic
research, the Ninth Circuit held that sexuality is an immutable,
fundamental characteristic that a person should not be required to
alter.32  The court found that sexual identity is inherent in one’s
personal identity33 and that it manifests itself in not only sexual
                                                          
a particular social group requires an examination of the voluntary association between
members).  The court held that “urban males [of military age] who have maintained political
neutrality in El Salvador ”were not protected by the asylum statute because the statute does not
protect “broadly defined segment[s] of the population.” Id. at 1576-77.  See also Hernandez-
Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1092 (noting that the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to suggest the
application of the voluntary association test).
28. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).  In explaining its decision, the
BIA stated that:
[t]he shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties,
or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military
leadership or land ownership.  The particular kind of group characteristic that will
qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one
that the members of the group cannot change, or should not be required to change
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.
 Id.
29. 801 F.2d at 1576.  The Ninth Circuit described the voluntary association of people to
be an implied
collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some
common impulse or interest.  Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary
associational relationship among the purported members, which imparts some
common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as member of that discrete
social group.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1092 (remarking that “in some particular social groups,
members of the group are not voluntarily associated by choice”).
31. Id. at 1093.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1093-94 (citing Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr. v. Georgetown
Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (holding that homosexuality is as inherent in a person’s identity
as heterosexuality)).
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conduct, but also in physical “dress and appearance.”34  It found
persuasive the BIA holding in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso35 and an
immigration judge’s decision in Matter of Tenorio.36
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the immigration judge and BIA’s
definition of “particular social group” was flawed.  It held that the
applicable definition was a group “composed of gay men with female
sexual identities in Mexico.”37  Using an expert’s testimony from the
asylum hearing as evidence, the court found that “gay men [in
Mexico] with female sexual identities” are “heavily persecuted by the
police and other groups within society . . . .  They are a separate social
entity within Latin American society . . . .”38
Where Hernandez-Montiel suffered expulsion from school,
ostracism from his family and police abuse because of his sexual
identity, the court determined that he is a member of the particular
social group of gay men in Mexico with female sexual identities.39
The court also observed that Hernandez-Montiel’s identity must be
fundamental or he would have changed it in the face of the abuse he
suffered.40  The BIA was wrong in concluding that Hernandez-
Montiel claimed he was persecuted against because of the way he
dressed.41
The court confirmed that Hernandez-Montiel must also prove that
he suffered persecution “on account of” his membership in the
particular social group.42  The motivation for Hernandez-Montiel’s
abuse must be his membership in the particular social group or his
                                                          
34. Id. at 1093.
35. 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820-23 (BIA 1990) (holding that homosexuality can establish
membership in a particular social group).
36. No. A72-093-558 (IJ July 26, 1993) (concluding that “a Brazilian man who had been
beaten and stabbed by a group of people in Rio de Janeiro who repeatedly used anti-gay
epithets” was a member of particular social group on the basis of his sexual orientation and
“had a well-founded fear of future persecution due to his membership” in that social group).
37. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094.
38. Id.  The expert testified that
gay men [in Mexico] with female sexual identities are singled out for persecution
because they are perceived to assume the stereotypical ‘female’, i.e., passive, role in gay
relationships.  Gay men with female sexual identities outwardly manifest their
identities through characteristics traditionally associated with women, such as
feminine dress, long hair, and fingernails.
Id.  The expert further testified that “it is commonplace for police to ‘hit the gay street . . . and
not only brutalize, but actually rape with batons . . . homosexual males that are dressed or
acting out the feminine role.’”  Id. at 1089.
39. Id. at 1095.
40. Id.
41. Id.  His dressing as a female is a manifestation of his sexual identity.  Id. at 1095.
42. Id. at 1096 (citing INA § 101(a)(42)(A)).
5
Bowles: Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000)
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2001
BOWLES_JCI01 10/7/01  7:52 PM
722 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 9:3
sexual identity.43  Based on the evidence, the court determined that
the police were motivated by Hernandez-Montiel’s dress, as his dress
was a manifestation of his sexual identity.44  The court dismissed the
government’s argument that Hernandez-Montiel was required to
prove that the abuse he suffered was based solely on his sexual
identity.45  Instead the court recognized that the “requirements for
asylum have been satisfied” where at least one motive “is [one] of the
statutorily enumerated grounds.”46  The court concluded that the
expert testimony established that Hernandez-Montiel was persecuted
on “account of his” membership in the “particular social group.”47
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the BIA erred in its
determination that Hernandez-Montiel did not establish past
persecution or a basis for well-founded fear of future persecution if
he returned to Mexico.48  The court reiterated a prior holding that
“persecution involves ‘the infliction of suffering or harm upon those
who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive.’”49  The persecution
suffered must be shown to have been “inflicted either by the
government or by persons or organizations, which the government is
unable or unwilling to control.”50  Hernandez-Montiel suffered
persecution, in the form of sexual assault and rape, at the hands of
the police.51
CONCLUSION
Hernandez-Montiel has a significant impact on those seeking asylum.
It is the first time that a federal court of appeals has recognized
                                                          
43. Id.
44. Id.  The court noted that the police did not detain or abuse everyone who dressed in
female clothing or had long hair and fingernails.  Id.
45. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1096.
46. Id. (citing Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509-10 (9th Cir. 1995) (commenting that the
“task of the . . .  [asylum seeker] is simply to demonstrate the reasonableness of a motivation [of
persecution] which is related to one of the enumerated grounds”)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1097-98.
49. Id. at 1097 (citing Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that
persecution is more than “just restrictions or threats to life and liberty”)).
50. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1097 (citing Sangha v. I.N.S., 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that an asylum seeker suffered persecution where he was threatened with
death by a terrorist group)) (quotations omitted).
51. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1097-98.  The court recognized that rape is a form of
persecution that causes severe psychological harm.  Id. at 1097 (citing Lopez-Galarza v. I.N.S.,
99 F.3d 954, 962 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding rape by government authorities to be a physical and
psychological form of persecution)).  The Ninth Circuit found that the BIA erred in its
conclusion that Hernandez-Montiel’s mistreatment “arose from his conduct . . . thus the rape
by the policemen, and the attack by the mob of gay bashers are not necessarily
persecution . . . .” Id. (quotations omitted).
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homosexuality or sexual identity as a basis for protection under the
INA asylum statute.52  The government has chosen not to appeal the
decision53 and the Justice Department has previously recognized that
homosexuals may be granted asylum “if they can prove that they were
victims of government persecution solely because of their sexual
preference.”54
It is also the first time that a federal court has identified sexual
identity as an immutable and fundamental characteristic in the
asylum law context.55  Federal courts have previously recognized
persecution on the grounds of gender.56  With Hernandez-Montiel, the
Ninth Circuit has expanded the basis for which people may claim
asylum to include sexual identity.  This expansion to include an
immutable characteristic as an alternative basis for establishing
membership in a social group will have a significant impact on
asylum-seekers who claim persecution based on “new” social groups,
such as those with a disability.57
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s recognition of the persecution
and violence suffered by homosexuals abroad may influence debate
on the necessity and importance of the protection of homosexuals,
such as with hate-crime legislation, in the United States.  Proponents
of the court’s decision argue that “the court has recognized the rights
of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender individuals to live without
the threat of death.”58
AMY R. BOWLES
                                                          
52. Alex Roth, Gay Man Granted Political Asylum: Basis of Ruling Said to Make It a First, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 25, 2000, at A3.
53. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Hernandez-Montiel v. INS: Final
Victory! (July 5, 2001), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/cases/record?record=81
(commenting on the significance of the decision in Hernandez-Montiel and noting that Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund filed an amicus brief).
54. Reno Broadens Immigration Rules for Gays, S.F. CHRON., June 17, 1994, at A3 (discussing
former Attorney General Janet Reno’s order allowing homosexuals to seek political asylum in
the United States).
55. Henry Weinstein, Persecuted Gay Man Wins Asylum Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000, at A3.
56. See, e.g., Abankwah v. I.N.S., 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that the asylum
seeker, a female native of Ghana, was entitled to asylum and recognizing female genital
mutilation as a form of persecution worthy of protection under the asylum statute).
57. See, Arlene Kanter & Kristin Dadey, The Right to Asylum for People with Disabilities, 73
TEMP. L. REV. 1117, 1155 (2000) (commenting that recent BIA and Court of Appeals decisions,
such as Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, make the social group category broad enough to include
people with disabilities).
58. Editorial, A Refugee Receives Asylum, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2000, at A26.
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